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 How the Indians Lost Their Land, Law and Power on the
Frontier 
 
(2005), Stuart Banner weaves together a perceptive interpretation
of the historical record, with a novel economic analysis of conflicts, to
create a sophisticated narrative of the process by which European colonists
took control of the lands that now comprise the United States. Banner’s
view of expropriation falls somewhere between the parsimony of an
economic model and the richness of a traditional historical account. It forms
part of a growing trend to focus on finding positive facts about the taking




Scholarship on how the Indians lost their land traditionally has
contained a strong normative framework, either celebrating the spread of
technology, free markets, and Christianity (Cohen 1947; de Vattel 1758)
or mourning the destruction of Indian societies (Williams 1990; Deloria
1974). A growing body of recent research, however, has forsaken moral judgment.
Led by economists venturing beyond their discipline’s usual boundaries, this
new approach instead focuses on answering positive questions: How did the
relative strength of the two sides at different times and places affect their
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were most successful? Did seemingly unrelated policies, such as the Homestead
Acts, actually facilitate the removal of Indians from their lands?
The historical record is at once patchy, complex, and contradictory.
Scholars of all disciplines seek underlying order in this stream of incomplete
and inconsistent data. Economists generally embrace parsimony, leaving
themselves open to charges of oversimplification, while historians frequently
resist this impulse to reduce complex events to compact theories. Stuart
Banner’s 
 
How the Indians Lost Their Land, Law and Power on the Frontier
 
,
follows a “Middle Ground” of sorts, leavening streamlined economics with
historical details that do not neatly fit into simple self-interest models. Banner
draws heavily on quasi-economic analysis in explaining expropriation, but
his positive models of expropriation are not as parsimonious as their economic
counterparts. His instincts, in the end, are historical, but the story he tells
is broadly consistent with prior economic accounts of how the Indians lost
their land.
Banner’s work is part of growing modern consensus, covering scholars
from multiple disciplines, about the process of expropriation. Moreover, in
addition to this substantive convergence, his work reinforces the trend toward
positive fact-finding instead of normative moral judging. Inevitably, some
will bemoan the retreat from ethical analysis of a core event in U.S. history.
This reaction, however, would be misguided. Positive and normative studies
on the expropriation of Indian land are radically different enterprises. Hope-
fully, the best of future normative scholarship will draw on newly discovered
positive facts to make more nuanced, precise judgments about the identity
and nature of the processes, institutions, groups, and individuals responsible




The great paradox in the process by which Indian tribes lost ownership
of almost all of America is the thin veneer of voluntariness (Indian deeds,
treaties) covering a process that was, in large part, coercive. Nobody has
better captured this paradox that de Tocqueville, writing in 1835 when the
process was still far from complete.
The Spaniards were unable to exterminate the Indian race by those
unparalleled atrocities which brand them with indelible shame, nor did
they succeed even in wholly depriving it of its rights; but the Americans
of the United States have accomplished this twofold purpose with
singular felicity, tranquilly, legally, philanthropically, without shedding
blood, and without violating a single great principle of morality in the
eyes of the world. It is impossible to destroy men with more respect
for the laws of humanity. (1990, 355)
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The destruction of the Indian tribes was far from instantaneous. Indeed,
the two cultures lived in close proximity and (relative) peace for more than
a century along a number of borders. Richard White (1991), in his detailed
study of Indian-colonist relations in the Great Lakes region, documents how
a rough parity of power in the early colonial period created incentives for
Indians and Europeans to live together peacefully in a “Middle Ground” based
on fairly negotiated treaties and voluntary trade. “The middle ground
depended on the inability of both sides to gain their ends through force.
The middle ground grew according to the need of people to find a means,





, then, has two distinct meanings in this essay: Banner’s blend of spare
economics and detailed history and White’s description of how a rough parity
of power created conditions for peaceable coexistence of Indians and
colonists. They are related in that Banner, like some of his predecessors, uses
economics to explain the existence of White’s “middle ground.”
Few, if any, would gainsay the role that military strength played in
Indian-colonist relations. The centrality of raw power would seem to make




 trade—about the last
discipline likely to provide any insights into the process by which the Indians
lost their land. It may come as some surprise, then, that over the last
decade economic analysis has exerted a powerful influence over scholarship
on expropriation.
The theoretical basis for applying economics in such an atypical domain
is the late Jack Hirschleifer’s “muscular economics”—the application of
economic principles to “the dark side of the force—to wit, crime, war, and politics”
(1994, 2). Criminals (and their victims) respond to incentives and costs. Nations
weigh costs and potential benefits before initiating a war, and may engage
in all sorts of strategic behavior (bluffing, building up an army as a deterrent or
a threat). Politicians similarly engage in strategic posturing (voting for doomed
bills to satisfy an interest group) and vote-trading (often called log-rolling).
The first principle of Hirschleifer’s muscular economics is that conflict
should be the exception rather than the rule. Fighting consumes considerable
resources of both sides—resources that can be saved 
 
and divided between the
potential combatants
 
 if they can somehow reach terms and avoid conflict. If
both sides have pretty good information about each other’s military capacity
and rationally process that information, they will come to similar estimates
about the likely outcome of war (a decisive victory for one side, a stalemate,
etc.). Each side then should be willing to settle for any terms at least as
favorable as its likely condition after war. The resources saved by avoiding
conflict comprise a somewhat unusual pot of gains from trade—trade here
meaning an agreement to avoid conflict and its costs.
This precept generally applies to Indian-colonist relations. Despite
assertions that there was a “time-honored . . . practice of waging war on the
Indians in order to force a land cession” (Williams 1990, 274), conflict was
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very much the exception to Indian-colonist relations. “The claims of the
historical school maintaining that Indian-white relations in this country were
from start to finish determined by violence . . . appear erroneous” (Anderson
and McChesney 1994, 45).
If a rough parity of power exists between two societies, neither can force
concessions by threats, and we expect to see peaceable trade between the
parties. This is precisely the middle ground analyzed by Richard White in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries between Great Lakes tribes and
early colonists. The relatively small bands of Europeans in the region at this
time lacked the power to cow the local Indians, and thus conflict was
extremely rare. The parties instead met on a middle ground, treating each





 for gains from trade between Indians and colonists at any point
of contact and in any age, were patent, as Thomas Jefferson noted: “[the
Indians are] very poor, and they want necessaries with which we abound.
We want lands with which they abound; and these natural wants seem to
offer fair grounds of mutual supply” (1907, 375). Banner (2005) concurs,
noting that “the English, who had plenty of goods, wanted Indian land, while
the Indians, who had plenty of land, wanted English goods. There were





 traded land for other things” (51).
As the number of colonists in the Great Lakes region expanded in the
latter half of the eighteenth century, however, things inevitably changed.
“The real crisis and the final dissolution of this world came when Indians
ceased to have the power to force whites onto the middle ground. Then
the desire of whites to dictate the terms of accommodation could be given
its head” (White 1991, xv). Even so, open conflict remained exceedingly
rare. The Indians, though weakened, still could impose considerable costs
on the colonists in terms of both life and money if war broke out.
Anderson and McChesney (1994) present evidence that the price paid
for Indian lands correlated closely with the relative power of each side at
different times and different locations. In the Great Lakes region and
elsewhere, colonists used means less direct and costly than warfare to exploit
their advantages. The most powerful mechanisms for sapping the Indians’
strength were spreading disease and thinning forest game. Both resulted
inevitably from concentrated settlement of colonists on a given frontier.
Through centuries of living in proximity to microbe-harboring domestic
animals, combined with natural selection, Europeans had evolved significant
resistance to many serious infectious diseases, especially smallpox. These
bacteria and viruses did not exist in the Americas, and so when colonists
transmitted them to Indians, whose immune systems had never evolved to
counter the diseases, death rates were catastrophic. Indian societies suffering
90 percent death rates could offer precious little resistance to Europeans’
pressure for land.
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After spreading microbes, frontier colonists unleashed their plants and
animals on the Indians’ forest hunting grounds. Every acre permanently
cleared for European-style farming was one less acre of forest that could
support deer, boars, and other game animals vital to Indian society for food,
clothing, and other necessities. European pigs foraged in the remaining
forests, where they out-competed Indian game animals for key foodstuffs (e.g.,
acorns and other seeds). Thus, Indians on the frontier who survived smallpox
plagues soon found their environment devoid of the animals indispensable
to their way of life. Starving tribes could offer but feeble resistance to the
colonists’ expansion and attached little value to their now-denuded
homelands. Thus, colonists could purchase Indian lands at extremely low
prices in ostensibly consensual transactions.
European migrations to frontier zones were not entirely natural, laissez-
faire phenomena. From the very first decades in Virginia, culminating in the
Homestead Acts of the mid-1800s, governments lured settlers to the some-
times dangerous and definitionally remote frontier by either giving them land
or requiring very modest payment. For land-rich (ignoring the Indians’ claims,
as Europeans generally did) but cash-poor governments, this was convenient.
More importantly, it was much cheaper to have settlers spread disease and
thin game than it was to equip an army and send it into battle on a distant
border. Doug Allen (1991) has argued that the Homestead Acts, often cast
as idealist leveling measures, had this much darker purpose (34).
When settlers lured to the frontier had spread disease, thinned game,
and thus seriously weakened their neighboring tribes, the parties sat down
to negotiate. An Indian land sale (a “cession”) inevitably followed. Here
again, in the negotiation process itself, Europeans had a leg up on their Indian
counterparts. The colonists’ finer division of labor and greater societal wealth
translated into a much more experienced cadre of negotiators. A typical
Indian chief negotiated one cession, or a couple at most. Some American
officials negotiated more than twenty such treaties. In addition, colonial
society could employ more agents to gather information about the tribe’s
strengths, internal divisions, and the minimum price at which they would
sell. Superior information conferred a decisive advantage in bargaining.
This amalgam of techniques Europeans employed to obtain Indian lands
cheaply (in terms of both blood and money) as a whole does not fit neatly
under either “forceable expropriation” or “consensual trade.” Instead, “there
was a continuum of techniques between these two poles. The United States
mixed and matched techniques from both extremes in order to minimize
the cost of Indian lands” (Kades 2000, 1072). Banner (2005) elaborates on
this point:
At most times, and in most places, the Indians were not exactly
conquered, but they did not exactly choose to sell their land either.
The truth was somewhere in the middle. The interesting question about
 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY832
 
Indian land sales is not whether they were voluntary or involuntary,




 at any given
time and place. (4, italics added)
Banner expresses considerable agreement with a theory of least-cost
expropriation of Indian lands. One of his central tenets is that “the ability
of the English to enforce contested transactions was a function of the degree
to which the English were more powerful than the Indians” (83). The main
narrative of the book is the story of how the growing power of the colonists
enabled them to obtain Indian land on ever more favorable terms.
Banner finds this general pattern applicable from the beginning of
colonization to the end. In the early colonial period, the strength of the
Indians quickly rendered inoperative assertions that the Indians, as nomads, did
not possess any ownership interest. Faced with a formidable foe, the colonists
quickly and universally adopted the practice of buying land from the Indians.
Banner assiduously tracks how the growing power disparity between the
colonists and Indians spawned terms of land transfer ever more skewed in
favor of the colonists, culminating in the reservation regime adopted after
the Civil War.
The law governing the acquisition of land from the Indians had always
been at odds with the actual practice of obtaining land, going back to
the early colonial period, but the divergence between the two reached
its widest point in the second half of the nineteenth century. The size
of the gap between theory and practice had always been a function of
the relative power of settlers and Indians. By the late nineteenth century,
the settlers were more powerful relative to the Indians, in terms of num-
bers and technology, than they had ever been. . . . The government was
democratically accountable to the settlers but not to the Indians, who
could not vote and who would have been greatly outnumbered even
if they could. (244)
Nonetheless, Banner rejects the overarching thesis that the colonists
deliberately schemed to expropriate Indian lands at least cost. “It would be
too much . . . to conceive of that result [efficient conquest] as having been
intended by anyone. Federal Indian policy came about not by plan but by
compromise” (148).
Banner may dismiss too quickly the possibility of a semiorganized plan
for least-cost expropriation. Although the historical record is complex, some
important sources seem to reveal important elements of just such a policy.
In a widely quoted letter, General Schuyler described the essentials of obtaining
Indian land at minimal cost.
[A]s our settlements approach their country, they must, from the scarcity
of game, which that approach will induce to, retire farther back, and
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dispose of their lands, unless they dwindle comparatively to nothing,
as all savages have done, who gain their sustenance by the chase, when
compelled to live in the vicinity of civilized people, and thus leave
us the country without the expense of a purchase, trifling as that will
probably be. (Schuyler 1783, 593, 601)
Among others, in 1783 George Washington embraced Schuyler’s vision.
[T]he Indians as has been observed in Gen. Schuyler’s Letter will ever
retreat as our Settlements advance upon them and they will be as ready
to sell, as we are to buy; That is the cheapest as well as the least
distressing way of dealing with them, none who are acquainted with
the Nature of Indian warfare, and has ever been at the trouble of esti-
mating the expence of one, and comparing it with the cost of purchasing
their Lands, will hesitate to acknowledge. (1931, 601)
A much larger governing apparatus helped colonists solve their own
collective action problems and handicapped the Indians’ attempts to do the
same (Kades 2000, 1118–30). Banner (2005) discusses one of the most
common means by which Americans exploited this situation:
Federal land purchasers immediately adopted the primary technique used
by devious private purchasers a half century earlier, that of exploiting
the collective action problems within tribes by securing “consent” to
sales from a small number of tribe members who had not been authorized
to speak for the tribe as a whole. (142)
Banner cites a significant number of American officials expressing
benevolence towards the Indians, seemingly at variance with such tricks and
General Schuyler’s calculating plan. One of Banner’s overarching themes is
the ongoing tension between benevolent easterners and a rapacious frontier
population.
On the frontier, many settlers hated the Indians and wished to grab
their land by force (and indeed to kill as many of them as possible in
the process). In the east, on the other hand, there were Americans who
genuinely wanted to treat the Indians more honorably, and some of
these, like Henry Knox, were in positions of power. . . . Indian land policy,
as it came to be carried out in practice, embodied a compromise between
these two views—a compromise between the desires of well-placed
easterners and of western settlers, between the force of idealism and
the force of self-interest on the frontier. (49)
Banner’s belief that sincere benevolence significantly influenced
American treatment of the Indians puts him in good company. Felix Cohen
(1947), a giant in Indian law scholarship, maintained that “we are probably
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the one great nation in the world that has consistently sought to deal with
an aboriginal population on fair and equitable terms. We have not always
succeeded in this effort but our deviations have not been typical” (34).
Similarly, a leading historian declared that “the treaties made with the Indians
. . . uniformly guaranteed Indian rights” (Prucha 1962, 248).
Undoubtedly many easterners were sincerely benevolent, and this
sentiment motivated them to push (sometimes successfully) for laws intended
to safeguard Indian lands and rights. The results, however, were always bitterly
disappointing. Banner carefully traces how successive policy measures
supposedly designed to benefit the Indians instead proved disastrous to their
interests: first removal to the west, then the creation of reservations, and then
the allotment regime. Banner seems to believe that these outcomes were
unintended, the product of (1) the inability of the central government to control
events on the frontier and (2) the general law of unintended consequences.




instance the law of unintended consequences worked against the Indians.
Probability would suggest that, absent specific intent to the contrary, some
unintended results would have worked to the Indians’ advantage. In addition,
easterners were not ignorant of their limited power to influence frontiersmen.
Long experience should have enabled them to factor in this constraint in
choosing policy measures that would actually benefit the Indians.
Yet the result was consistent: expressions of benevolence never translated
into substantial protection of the Indians. If western frontiersmen did have
to compromise with their compassionate cousins on the coast, it appears that
they did not have to compromise much. In the complex political horse-
trading between the two groups, protecting the Indians does not seem to
have been a particular priority for the eastern population. No doubt many
individuals believed passionately in this cause; Banner quotes them to good
effect. In the end, however, muscular economics (as opposed to benevolence
coupled with unintended consequences) provides a more credible explanation
for the deleterious effect of virtually all American policies on the Indians.
Banner’s (2005) view of the role played by physical threats and the actual
use of force also deviates from the interpretation offered by muscular economics.
He says that although the process of expro priation was a story of power,
it was a more subtle and complex kind of power than we conventionally
recognize. . . . It was the power to establish the legal institutions and
the rules by which land transactions would be enforced. The threat of
physical force would always be present, but most of the time it could
be kept out of view because it was not needed. (6)
From the economic perspective, however, these legal institutions and rules
were mere window dressing. Without the power to enforce them, of what use
were legal rules that colonists hoped would give them an edge? Moreover,
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the economic approach offers a cogent and powerful explanation for the
relative rarity of conflict: Hirschleifer’s (1994) first principle of muscular
economics, that rational and informed parties will avoid conflict and divide





in such situations is not “kept out of view”; indeed, it is critical to make
ostentatious displays of power, so that an opponent can accurately forecast
the costs of war, or even better, overestimate your military might.
Banner’s (2005) disagreement with the economic theory of least-cost
conquest illustrates a fundamental tension discussed at the outset of this essay:
the parsimony of economics versus the richness of history. Banner’s book
strikes a balance between these two poles. He describes a course of events
more nuanced and subtle than least-cost conquest, but the book never turns
into a simple catalog of facts without any organizing framework. From
a scholarly perspective, he settles on a middle ground that few, if any others,
have occupied. Consequently, his work should be of interest to both historians




Banner’s discussion is ruthlessly positive: he relies on a careful and
complete review of the historical record to draw inferences and avoids moral
judgments. One might well think that, given the volume of scholarship
on Indian relations and the consequent repeated close readings given to
the limited historical record, there simply are no new facts to discover,
rendering positive projects futile. Banner, however, puts the lie to that
supposition.
An additional facet of the “least-cost conquest” model presented in the
previous section is the very widely accepted “fact” that colonists, from the
earliest of times, barred private purchases of Indian land and instead
channeled all such dealings through the government. This “fact” is enshrined





which contains a copious historical discussion of the long-standing and
universal bar to private purchases of Indian lands. Marshall found that Indians
(under the colonists’ laws) had a limited title of occupancy that did not
include free rights of alienability. Barring competitive bidding for Indian
lands, of course, fits well within a model of efficient expropriation. A monopsonist
(a single buyer—the converse of a monopolist) generally pays less than the
price that would prevail in a competitive market.
Without doubt, Banner’s (2005) most important historical contribution
is his novel and creative argument that no such monopsony existed for the
first century and a half of colonization. He maintains that from landfall at
Jamestown in 1607 until The Proclamation of 1763, private colonists
purchased most Indian land with no real state oversight. Banner maintains
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that “Indian property rights in land in the colonial period were full property




 and by later writers” (28).
Banner is taking on not just Chief Justice Marshall and his con-
temporaries, but the prevailing view among contemporary scholars. “It is a
reasonable generalization to say that land purchases from Indians were
a governmental monopoly” (Springer 1986, 25). Harris (1953), a leading
historian of early American land tenure, also reads the subsequent record
quite differently than Banner.
Many formal authorizations for purchase from the Indians indicate that
these laws [requiring governmental assent for purchases of Indian lands]
were rather well enforced. Many recorded cases of refusal to confirm
purchases made outside of these laws also substantiate this conclusion.
The New England colonies generally followed the practice of preventing
private purchases from the Indians without specific authorization. (159)
Harris seems to have discovered detailed documentation showing that
colonies’ enforcement of their statutes regulating Indian land purchase was
meticulous, but frustratingly he does not include his sources for this assertion.
There is other evidence contrary to Banner’s position. Connecticut in 1702
barred any entity save townships from purchasing Indian land, and voided
at least two private purchases (164–65).
The crux of the matter comes down to the application of statutes
requiring governmental approval of citizen purchases of Indian land. Every
colony enacted such a statute soon after formation. The traditional view,
as summarized by Springer (1986) in the previous paragraph, is that colonies
used such statutes to monitor and control all purchases of Indian lands.
Banner disagrees. “Individual colonies had long required purchasers of
Indian land to obtain the colonial government’s permission, 
 
but that require-
ment had never been onerous and had never prevented many sales from taking
place
 
” (2005, 94, italics added). He argues that the purpose of the statutes





like the laws regulating any other market” (27, italics added). He seems to
have reached this conclusion inductively, based in part on the large number
of Indian deeds executed in colonial times.
Banner argues that “the fact that every colony had such laws . . . suggests
that the norm was to purchase land from the Indians” (27). This contention,
however, is not self-evident. Markets that work well tend to go unregulated,
and thus the enactment of the statutes requiring governmental approval for
purchasing Indian lands would seem to suggest that the colonists rapidly
concluded that unregulated purchases of Indian lands were problematic. The
historical record clearly identifies at least one worry: fraudulent purchases
might enrage the Indians, who would fight to prevent attempts to occupy
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lands so obtained. Moreover, requiring state approval to purchase Indian lands
(if such approval was not given perfunctorily) limited bidding for Indian land,
thus lowering the price paid.
This debate is of wider historical interest. Banner argues that the ability





rights during the 1600s and through the better part of the 1700s. It is perhaps





 during this period. At any rate, he argues that the Founding
generation in effect rewrote history by arguing that from the earliest dates
(effectively, the enactment of those colonial statutes requiring governmental
approval of land purchases), Indians could sell only when the colonies so
desired (chap. 5).
This transition, from free restricted alienability, began no later than
1763, according to Banner, when the British explicitly banned private
purchases of Indian land in a famous proclamation (referred to, understandably,
as the Proclamation of 1763). It was only at this relatively late date, Banner
maintains, that the colonists began the seemingly odd practice, in derogation
of the Indians’ full alienation rights, of selling land still occupied by Indians
to citizens (163, 183).
Banner argues that the conversion from full to limited Indian property
rights took place within decades during the Revolutionary era. In discussing
Jefferson’s assertion that the preemption rights of the United States were
“fundamental,” he says, “if so, it had become fundamental very quickly, having
been proclaimed by Britain only in 1763” (136). “The idea that the Indians
possessed only a right of occupancy in their unsold land was a concept that
was only three decades old in 1823. English colonial law had included no
such concept, nor had American law before the 1790s” (179).
I have some qualms about these assertions. There is no doubt, for





(e.g., Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland) to its proprietor despite the presence
of tribes well able to defend their claims. Harris (1953) states that “the early
practice in North Carolina involved grants from the proprietors to the settlers,
who in turn purchased the Indian rights” (170). These doubts, however, are
far from proof that Banner (2005) is wrong. Whatever the ultimate resolution
of this question (if it ever is resolved), Banner deserves great credit for
creatively and boldly questioning a fundamental assumption of almost every
other historian of Indian land rights.
Banner builds on his provocative thesis by arguing that this change in
the colonists’ mind-set about Indian property rights had important implications
for the two groups’ relations.
The idea that the Indians owned their land had taken a series of blows,
which cumulatively were fatal. First was the Proclamation of 1763,
which ended the private purchase of Indian land. When the Indians
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were no longer allowed to sell land to buyers 
 
of their own choosing
 
, it
became possible to think of the Indians’ property rights as something
short of full ownership. (189)
In addition, he finds that the practice of selling lands still occupied by the
Indians, along with sentiment that the United States should take land by
conquest from tribes who sided with the British during the war, also
contributed to the colonists’ devaluation of Indian property rights. Elsewhere,
he notes that as Europeans, rightly or wrongly, started to view Indians as
less agricultural and more nomadic, they showed decreasing respect for
Indians’ property rights (156–57).
These points are plausible, but they are a marked shift from economic
incentives to intellectual conceptions as the driving force behind the
evolution in Indian-colonist land relations. To the economically minded, this
change in gears is unnecessary and results in a loss of focus. Under the economic
view, as discussed above, the colonists’ ever-growing power advantage over
the Indians is the root explanation for changes in Indian relations. It comes
as little surprise, then, that as the power gap widened in the late 1700s, and
as divisions in the colonial community (between Revolutionaries and Tories)
disappeared, colonists would behave more aggressively and expropriatively
towards the Indians. All talk of rights of conquest, ability to sell land still
occupied by Indians, barring private purchases, and the inability of nomads
to possess true title to land were simply doctrinal excuses to expropriate
Indians lands on terms ever more favorable to the colonists. If Americans
had taken their own rhetoric seriously, for example, they would have
respected the title of the Cherokees more than other tribes based on that
tribe’s embrace of sedentary European agriculture. The Cherokees’ Trail of
Tears puts the lie to any notion that abstract legal doctrines stood as anything
stronger than gossamer in restraining the exercise of raw power by colonists.
Banner’s deviation from his own thesis at this juncture perhaps is
symptomatic of his ambitious attempt to depict a multifaceted historical
landscape. Although generally maintaining fidelity to his thesis that power
relations explain Indian-colonist relations, he does not shy away from subplots
with divergent explanations. Although I did not find some of these stories
persuasive, they are invariably sophisticated and thought-provoking. More
generally, Banner manages to squeeze novel lessons from scant and well-
trodden sources. A typical example is his compelling rendition of the original
and evolving states of mind of the Indians and the English on the meaning
of a land sale. Banner convincingly documents the two sides’ unsurprisingly
divergent initial understandings and the surprisingly quick convergence
brought on by the accelerating frequency of land dealings (56–62). Although
only tangentially relevant to the story of expropriation, this careful tracing
of societal understandings about land tenure is a valuable addition to the
history of Indian-colonist relations.
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Banner is one of the few academics able to occupy a middle ground
between the rich tapestry of history and the spare explanations of economics.
His book is both a contribution to the growing modern consensus about
the process of expropriating Indian lands and a deep source of original facts
and novel interpretations of the historical record. Banner demonstrates that
we still have much to learn from careful, positive, fact-based research on
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